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Abstract
Voting problems are central in the area of social choice. In this article,
we investigate various voting systems and types of control of elections. We
present integer linear programming (ILP) formulations for a wide range
of NP-hard control problems. Our ILP formulations are flexible in the
sense that they can work with an arbitrary number of candidates and
voters. Using the off-the-shelf solver Cplex, we show that our approaches
can manipulate elections with a large number of voters and candidates
efficiently.
1 Introduction
When a group of people with individual preferences has to decide which alter-
native to choose from a given set of alternatives, an election is often carried out.
The voting rule underlying the election can be regarded as an algorithm that
computes from the individual preferences of the people (which in this context
are called voters) those alternatives which are accepted as ‘best’ choices by the
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whole group. Ideally, there should be exactly one such alternative, the winning
one.
There are many different voting rules to determine the winners of elections,
each coming with different advantages and drawbacks. For example, it is desir-
able to have a voting rule that can be computed efficiently and has exactly one
winner. On the other hand, if it is easy to manipulate the election structure
to get one’s favorite candidate to win, then this is regarded as negative in view
of susceptibility to illegal influence. [Walsh, 2011] discusses the types of illegal
influence. So, voting rules not only should be efficient, they also should be hard
(ideally even impossible) to influence in an illegal way.
Research on computational social choice applies techniques of computer sci-
ence, mainly from algorithmic and complexity theory, to problems from social
choice theory (see the articles of [Chevaleyre et al., 2007] and [Brandt et al., 2013]
for an overview). Central computational questions in the area of computational
social choice are the efficiency of voting rules and their susceptibility to illegal
influence. In this paper, we investigate a specific kind of illegal influence, called
control. We investigate the case where an actor seeks to have a desired candi-
date winning the election by removing a set of voters (or candidates) from the
election.
[Bartholdi et al., 1992] have initiated a new line of research that investi-
gates the susceptibility to control by techniques from complexity theory. The
goal is to prevent attacks using certain types of control by showing that they
lead to NP-hard decision problems. Following [Bartholdi et al., 1992], numer-
ous papers have investigated the complexity of control problems for elections
([Conitzer et al., 2007], [Hemaspaandra et al., 2007], [Faliszewski et al., 2008],
[Faliszewski et al., 2011], and [Rothe and Schend, 2012]). For many voting sys-
tems it is shown that certain control problems are hard. From a theoretical
point of view such voting systems can be regarded as secure against this at-
tempt to illegal influence. The hardness results mentioned previously often
assume a growing number of candidates and voters. It is known that many vot-
ing problems with few candidates are easy to manipulate ([Conitzer et al., 2007,
Walsh, 2007]) as this restricts the number of choices the voters have.
In the context of computational social choice, [Walsh, 2011] clearly demon-
strates that NP-hardness is not a barrier to manipulations and illegal influ-
ences. [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006] present a simple influence algorithm for
elections that works fast and yields for most inputs (according to a suitably
chosen probability distribution) the desired result. Another approach to solve
hard control problems in practice is proposed by [Berghammer et al., 2014],
[Berghammer and Schnoor, 2014], and [Berghammer, 2014]. It combines rela-
tion algebra and the BDD-based computer algebra system RelView and yields
algorithms which are correct for all instances. Different problems from social
choice have also been examined in the context of fixed-parameter tractabil-
ity, and fixed parameter algorithms can be obtained in many cases by using
integer programming formulations (see for example [Lindner and Rothe, 2008,
Hemaspaandra et al., 2012]). For rules like Borda, Bucklin, and Copeland, it is
fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the number of candidates to determine
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possible winners when given are incomplete votes ([Betzler et al., 2009]).
We study voting problems in terms of the number of voters n and the num-
ber of candidatesm, where both are variable. The present paper follows the line
initiated by [Gurski and Roos, 2014] who used binary integer programming to
solve some hard control problems for two closely related voting systems, known
as Copeland voting and Llull voting, respectively. We show how the hard control
problems of the (quite different) voting systems can be specified as integer pro-
grams, and present results of computational experiments. Our computational
results show a good performances of the introduced approaches even if both the
number of voters and the number of candidates is large.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we intro-
duce the notion of a voting system and present the specific voting systems we
will consider in this paper. Section 3 is devoted to several control problems in
voting systems and their computational complexities. How to model the hard
types of control for the voting systems of Section 2 as integer programs is shown
in Section 4, which constitutes the core of the paper. Herein, we mainly con-
centrate on constructive control where the actor seeks to ensure his favourite
alternative’s victory. Section 5 presents the results of our computational exper-
iments, which we have performed on the test benchmark suite of the Preference
Library (commonly referred to as PrefLib, [Mattei and Walsh, 2013]) using one
of the well-known off-the-shelf solvers for integer programs. The results of our
experiments show that our approach is able to solve all the test instances to
optimality quite fast using an ordinary personal computer. Moreover, even the
hard instances related to larger elections can be handled in reasonable time. Fi-
nally, Section 6 contains some concluding remarks and presents topics for future
investigations in this area of work.
2 Voting Systems
In the following, we introduce the notions of a voting system and an election as
generally used in social choice theory as well as the particular voting systems
we will treat in this paper. For more details on voting in social choice the-
ory and additional voting systems we refer to the studies of [Tideman, 2007],
[Brams and Fishburn, 2007], [Laslier, 2012], and [Brandt et al., 2013].
In social choice theory, a voting system (also called a voting protocol) consists
of a finite and non-empty set C of candidates (alternatives, proposals, options),
a finite and non-empty set V of voters (players, agents, individuals), the indi-
vidual preferences (choices, wishes) of the single voters, and a voting rule that
aggregates the winners from the individual preferences. Usually the pair (C, V )
is called an election. In such a definition the representation of the individual
preferences remains out of consideration. Since it, however, will play a funda-
mental role in our approach, in this paper we use a slightly more general notion
of elections and define them as triples (C, V, I), where the third component I is
the specification of the individual preferences.
To simplify presentation, in the remainder of the paper we assume that the
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two sets C and V are given as C = {c1, . . . , cm} and V = {v1, . . . , vn}, where
m,n∈N>0 are non-zero natural numbers.
2.1 Approval Voting
A well-known voting system is approval voting, which has been introduced by
[Brams and Fishburn, 2007]. For example, it is presently used by several sci-
entific organizations including the Mathematical Association of America and
the Institute of Management Science. Here each voter may approve (that is,
vote for) as many candidates as he wants and then the candidate with more
approvals than all other candidates is declared as the winner. If we model the
individual preferences by functions av : C → {0, 1} such that av(c) = 1 iff voter
v approves candidate c, for all v ∈V and c∈C, then an approval election can be
specified formally as a triple (C, V, (av)v ∈V ) and a candidate c
∗ is then defined
as the winner iff ∑
v∈V
av(c
∗) >
∑
v∈V
av(c), (1)
for all c∈C \ {c∗}. Note, that this specification of a winner implies winners
to be unique. In case that inequality (1) holds, candidate c∗ is said to strictly
dominate candidate c.
The strict dominance relationD on the set C, for all c, d ∈ C defined by cD d
iff
∑
v∈V av(c) >
∑
v∈V av(d), is asymmetric. But it may happen that there
exist pairs of different candidates c and d such that neither cD d nor dD c. As a
consequence, a candidate that strictly dominates all other ones (the winner) does
not necessarily exist. For this reason, in the literature a variant of approval vot-
ing is also investigated, where dominance is weak. Here, candidate c∗ wins the
election (C, V, (av)v∈V ) iff for all c∈C it holds
∑
v∈V av(c
∗) ≥
∑
v∈V av(c).
The advantage of this variant is that winners always exist, while the disadvan-
tage is that they may not to be unique. In this paper, we concentrate on voting
systems with strict dominance and the unique-winner condition. It is not hard
to translate all our results to the variants with weak dominance and possibly
multiple winners.
2.2 Range Voting
Approval voting can be regarded as a specific instance of a range voting system.
(Unfortunately, the terminology is not unique in the literature on voting and
instead of range voting various other names are used, e.g., scoring-based voting,
average voting, utility voting, and ratings summation.) Elections of such voting
systems are specified as triples (C, V, (sv)v ∈V ), where each scoring function
sv : C → N specifies how many points voter v gives to each of candidates, for all
v ∈V . A candidate with strictly more points than all other candidates is defined
as the winner. Therefore, candidate c∗ wins the range election (C, V, (sv)v∈V )
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iff for all c∈C \ {c∗} it holds
∑
v∈V
sv(c
∗) >
∑
v∈V
sv(c). (2)
Another well-known voting system is the Borda voting system, also called
Borda count and developed already in the 18th century by the French math-
ematician and political scientist J.-C. de Borda. Each single voter ranks all
candidates from top to bottom without ties, i.e., in a strictly decreasing man-
ner, under the simplest form of the Borda count by giving |C| − 1 points to the
top candidate, |C| − 2 points to the next one and so on, with 0 points for the
candidate being ranked last. The candidate with the most points is the win-
ner. With regard to the specification of the voters’ preferences and the winner
only, the Borda count can be interpreted as a specific instance of range vot-
ing, where all scoring functions sv are injective and fulfill the range restriction
sv(C) = {0, 1, . . . , |C| − 1}. But this similarity is rather simplistic. If addi-
tional features and properties are considered, then range voting and the Borda
count show strong differences and these prevent such an interpretation in many
cases. In view of the present paper it is important that such an interpretation
makes it impossible to control Borda elections by changing the set of candi-
dates – procedures, which are studied in the literature, e.g., in [Russell, 2007],
[Eklind et al., 2011] and [Lorregia et al., 2015] – since a change of C usually
destroys the the range restriction sv(C) = {0, 1, . . . , |C| − 1}.
2.3 Preference-Based Voting
The four voting systems we consider in the remainder of this section are preference-
based. This means that, as in the case of Borda voting, each single voter ranks
all candidates from top to bottom in a strictly decreasing manner. In contrast
with Borda voting, however, now the individual preferences of the single voters
v are modeled by means of linear strict orders >v (that is, asymmetric and tran-
sitive relations, where each pair of different elements is comparable) on the set
C, which directly describes the strictly decreasing order of the candidates. For a
given election (C, V, (>v)v ∈V ) with a so-called preference profile (>v)v∈V the
four following preference-based voting systems only differ in their voting rules.
In the Condorcet voting system (named after the 18th-century French math-
ematician and philosopher N. de Condorcet) candidate c strictly dominates an-
other candidate d iff the number of voters v with c >v d is strictly larger than
the number of voters v with d >v c. As a consequence, candidate c
∗ wins the
Condorcet election (C, V, (>v)v∈V ) iff
|{v ∈V : c∗ >v c}| > |{v∈ V : c >v c
∗}|, (3)
for all c∈C \ {c∗}. Already Condorcet noted a voting paradox that nowadays
is called the Condorcet paradox. In our terminology it means that the strict
dominance relation of a Condorcet election may contain cycles – even if it relates
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each pair of different candidates (i.e., is a so-called tournament relation). In such
a case it may happen that there exists no winner.
When the plurality voting system is used, the most common voting system in
the Anglo-Saxon world, then candidate c strictly dominates another candidate
d iff the number of voters with c as top preference is strictly larger than the
number of voters with d as top preference. Thus, candidate c∗ wins the plurality
election (C, V, (>v)v ∈V ) iff
|{v∈ V : c∗ = maxv C}| > |{v∈ V : c = maxv C}|, (4)
for all c∈C \ {c∗}. In (4) maxv C denotes the greatest element of the set C
w.r.t. the linear strict order >v, i.e., that element c∈C for which c >v d for all
d∈C \ {c}.
The maximin voting system uses the maximin principle, originally formu-
lated for two player zero-sum games, and also defines the winner by means of
the cardinalities of the sets {v∈V : c >v d}. If we call |{v ∈V : c >v d}| the
advantage of candidate c over candidate d and define the function
Φ : C → N Φ(c) = min{|{v∈V : c >v d}| : d∈C \ {c}}
that yields for each candidate the minimum of all its advantages over all other
candidates, then candidate c∗ wins the maximin election (C, V, (>v)v∈V ) iff
Φ(c∗) > Φ(c), (5)
for all c∈C \ {c∗}, that is, iff it maximizes the minimum of all advantages over
all other candidates and this maximum advantage is unique.
Finally, we consider the Bucklin voting system, named after the American
J.W. Bucklin but already proposed by Condorcet. Strictly speaking, we de-
scribe a rule that is known as simplified Bucklin rule. This rule is based on the
candidates’ Bucklin scores, which are computed via the function
Ψ : C → N>0 Ψ(c) = min{k∈N>0 : |{v∈V : c∈ rankv,k}| >
n
2
},
where rankv,k := {c∈C : |{d∈C : d >v c}| < k} is the set of candidates
which are ranked among the top k positions by voter v, for all k∈N>0 and
v ∈V . In words, the Bucklin score Ψ(c) of candidate c is the least (positive)
natural number k such that c is ranked among the top k positions by (strictly)
more than half of the voters. By definition then, candidate c∗ wins the Bucklin
election (C, V, (>v)v ∈V ) iff
Φ(c∗) < Φ(c), (6)
for all c∈C \{c∗}, that is, iff it minimizes the Bucklin scores and this minimum
is unique.
3 Control Problems in Voting Systems
This section introduces the different types of control we consider in this paper
and presents their computational complexities for the voting systems we have
introduced in the previous section.
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3.1 Constructive and Destructive Control by Deleting
If control problems in voting systems are modeled mathematically, then it is
assumed that the authority conducting the election (the actor mentioned in the
introduction, in the literature on voting systems is usually called the chair)
knows all individual preferences of the single voters. His goal then is to achieve
a specific result by a strategic change of the set of candidates or voters, re-
spectively, but not of the individual preferences of the voters. To conceal his
manipulations, the chair furthermore tries to change these sets as little as pos-
sible.
The literature on voting systems investigates several types of strategic changes.
In the present paper, we allow only deleting candidates and voters, respectively,
as the chair’s possibilities. We mainly focus on constructive control as inves-
tigated for the first time by [Bartholdi et al., 1992] in view of computational
complexity. Using this type of control, the chair’s goal is to make his favourite
candidate c∗ the winner. The counterpart of constructive control is destructive
control. Here the chair tries to prevent a specific disliked candidate c∗ from
being the winner. First results on the computational complexity of this type of
control were given by [Hemaspaandra et al., 2007].
The control of elections by deleting candidates or voters can be stated as
a minimization problem ([Bartholdi et al., 1992, Hemaspaandra et al., 2007]).
If constructive control is done by deleting candidates, then the problem is as
follows: Given an election (C, V, I) and the specific candidate c∗, compute a
minimum set of candidates M such that c∗ ∈ C \M and the deletion of M from
C and of its candidates from the individual preferences ensures that c∗ is the
winner of the resulting election. To allow for an easier modeling in Section 4,
we consider the dual maximization-problem and ask for
(a) a maximum subset C∗ ⊆ C such that c∗ ∈ C∗ and c∗ wins the election
(C∗, V, I), in which the original individual preferences are restricted to C∗.
It is obvious that from the set C∗ then the desired set M is obtained by defining
M := C \ C∗. In an analogous manner we specify the constructive control
problem by deleting voters as maximization-problem for a given election (C, V, I)
and the specific candidate c∗. Again we ask for
(b) a maximum subset V ∗ of V such that c∗ wins the election (C, V ∗, I), in
which the original individual preferences are restricted to V ∗.
Using the specifications (a) and (b), we can immediately obtain specifications
of the destructive variants of the controls via deleting by replacing the phrase
‘such that c∗ wins’ by the phrase ‘such that c∗ does not win’.
In Section 2 we have explained by means of approval voting and the Con-
dorcet paradox that in voting systems with strict dominance and the unique-
winner condition it may happen that no candidate wins. This implies that also
solutions of the control problems do not necessarily have to exist. When we
later model control problems as integer programs, then the non-existence of a
winner of a control problem will be expressed by the fact that the modeling
program has no feasible solution.
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3.2 Complexity of Control by Deleting Candidates or Vot-
ers
Given a voting system, some control problems may be easy, some may be hard,
and in some cases it may even be impossible for the chair to reach his goal.
If a control problem is easy, one says that the voting system is vulnerable to
this type of control. In this case, there exists an efficient algorithm that solves
the problem to optimality in polynomial time. If it is hard, one says that it is
resistant to this type of control. This is formally specified by the NP-hardness of
the decision problem corresponding to the original optimization problem with
a bound for the size as an additional input. In case of constructive control
by deleting candidates, an instance of the decision problem corresponding to
the original minimization problem consists of an election (C, V, I), the specific
candidate c∗, and a natural number k. The question is whether it is possible to
delete at most k candidates such that c∗ wins the resulting election. If a problem
is unsolvable, one says that it is immune to this type of control. This means
that it is never possible for the chair to reach his goal by the corresponding
control action. In other words, no feasible solution exists for the unsolvable
control problem.
Inspired by the seminal paper of [Bartholdi et al., 1992], scientists have in-
vestigated the hardness of control problems via the methods of complexity the-
ory. See, e.g., the references given in the introduction or by [Brandt et al., 2013]
in Section 3.2 of their study. In the following, we summarize the results con-
cerning the voting systems we have discussed in Section 2 and the four types of
control we have considered above.
Approval voting and Condorcet voting are vulnerable to destructive con-
trol by deleting voters and to constructive control by deleting candidates, re-
sistant to constructive control by deleting voters, and immune to destructive
control by deleting candidates. For the constructive control types these re-
sults are proved by [Hemaspaandra et al., 2007] for approval voting and by
[Bartholdi et al., 1992] for Condorcet voting; for the destructive control types
they are proved by [Hemaspaandra et al., 2007]. Since we have introduced ap-
proval voting as a specific instance of range voting, also the latter kind of voting
is resistant to constructive control by deleting voters and immune to destruc-
tive control by deleting candidates. The Borda voting system is proved to be
vulnerable to destructive control by deleting voters. The questions on com-
plexity of constructive control types, as well as destructive control by deleting
candidates are still open to the best of our knowledge. However, for elections of
precisely three candidates the Borda voting system is vulnerable to constructive
control by deleting voters, as shown by [Russell, 2007]. We refer to the study of
[Russell, 2007], [Eklind et al., 2011] and [Lorregia et al., 2015] for further dis-
cussions concerning the complexity of control of Borda elections. Plurality
voting is vulnerable to constructive as well as destructive control by deleting
voters and resistant to constructive as well as destructive control by deleting
candidates. Here the proofs for the constructive control types are presented
by [Bartholdi et al., 1992] and those for the destructive control types again by
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[Hemaspaandra et al., 2007]. For maximin voting the situation is exactly con-
trary to plurality voting. The maximin voting system is vulnerable to con-
structive as well as destructive control by deleting candidates and resistant to
constructive as well as destructive control by deleting voters. Concerning proofs
of these facts we refer to the study of [Faliszewski et al., 2011]. Finally, Bucklin
voting is vulnerable to destructive control by deleting voters and resistant to
the three other types of control, i.e., destructive control by deleting candidates
and constructive control by deleting candidates as well as voters. These facts
are shown by [Rothe and Schend, 2012].
4 Modeling Control Problems as Integer Pro-
grams
Using Linear Programming (LP) has been shown to be successful for optimiza-
tion problems in various fields ([Chva´tal, 2007]). In the so-called standard form,
an LP formulation consists of a linear objective function f : Rn≥0 → R≥0 given
as
f(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
j=1
cjxj
that has to be maximized, and m linear inequality constraints
n∑
j=1
ai,jxj ≤ bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Furthermore, there is the non-negative variables condition requiring that xj ∈
R≥0.
In many practical applications it is additionally required that the variables
range over the set N only. Restricting the variables to only non-negative integer
values leads to an integer linear programming (ILP) formulation. In contrast to
LP, the ILP problem is NP-hard as shown by [Karp, 1972] even for the special
case of binary integer programming (abbreviated as BIP), where xj ∈ {0, 1} is
required. Nevertheless, there are tools available that also allow to solve larger
instances of ILP and BIP by techniques like relaxation and branch-and-bound.
Examples are the Mathlab LP solver, Xpress, Gurobi and the Cplex tool of
IBM.
In this section, we demonstrate how the hard control problems of the voting
systems introduced in Section 3 can be specified as ILPs and BIPs, respectively.
Without loss of generality, we work under the assumption that c∗ = c1, i.e., that
the chair’s goal is having the first candidate winning (loosing) for constructive
(destructive) control. We consider the control problems as maximization prob-
lems as introduced in Section 3 via the specifications (a) and (b). We restrict us
to constructive control and sketch in Section 4.6 how our models for constructive
control can be adapted for destructive one.
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max
n∑
j=1
xj (7)
s.t.
n∑
j=1
A1jxj −
n∑
j=1
Aijxj ≥ 1 i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} (8)
xj ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ {1, . . . , n} (9)
Figure 1: Binary Integer Program for Range Elections (Deleting Voters)
4.1 Range Election Model
Since approval voting is the specific case of range voting where all scores are
zero or one, we start our modeling with the constructive control of range voting
by deleting voters. To this end, we assume a range election (C, V, (sv)v ∈V ) to
be given. As a first step, we combine the list of scoring functions (sv)v∈V into
a single matrix A∈Nm×n such that
Aij = svj (ci),
for all i∈ {1, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Next, we represent a solution of the
control problem by the binary decision vector x ∈ {0, 1}n such that xj = 1 iff
voter vj is allowed to vote, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Consequently, we arrive at the
binary integer program (RE) of Figure 1 that models the given problem.
Because we ask for a maximum subset V ∗ of V such that c1 wins the range
election (C, V ∗, (sv)v∈V ∗), (7) describes the objective function as the maximum
number of voters allowed to take part in voting. The set of constraints (8)
supposes that candidate c1 is the unique winner of (C, V
∗, (sv)v∈V ∗) since it
collects the largest total amount of scores. Finally, (9) states that variables
x1, . . . , xn are binary. Note that the solution of the proposed (RE) program is
in the dual form respecting the initial problem statement given in Section 2.2.
In fact, each value xj , where j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, with xj = 0 of the solution vector
x defines voter vj to be excluded from the voting process in the standard form.
We have already mentioned that a solution of a control problem not neces-
sarily has to exist and this is expressed by the fact that the modeling integer
program has no feasible solution. The sufficient condition of the existence of
a feasible solution for the program (RE) is the existence of at least one voter
whose preference list quotes c1 as the best candidate. Otherwise, deleting any
subset of voters may not lead to a feasible solution where c1 wins.
4.2 Condorcet Election Model
As the second problem, we investigate the constructive control by deleting voters
for a given Condorcet election (C, V, (>v)v∈V ). Doing so, we represent the
10
max
n∑
j=1
xj (10)
s.t.
n∑
j=1
(2Aij − 1)xj ≥ 1 i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1} (11)
xj ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ {1, . . . , n} (12)
Figure 2: Binary Integer Program for Condorcet Elections (Deleting Voters)
preference profile (>v)v∈V by a single binary matrix A∈{0, 1}
(m−1)×n such
that for all i∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n} it holds
Aij = 1 ⇐⇒ c1 >vj ci+1.
To give an example, if we assume the set C = {c1, c2, c3, c4} of candidates, the
set V = {v1, v2, v3} of voters, and the preference profile
v1 : c1 >v1 c2 >v1 c3 >v1 c4
v2 : c1 >v2 c3 >v2 c2 >v2 c4
v3 : c4 >v3 c3 >v3 c2 >v3 c1,
then the binary matrix A∈ {0, 1}3×3 that represents this preference profile looks
as follows:
A =

 1 1 01 1 0
1 1 0


We establish the binary decision vector x ∈ {0, 1}n to represent the solution
V ∗ of the problem, that is, have xj = 1 iff voter vj is permitted to vote in
(C, V ∗, (>v)v∈V ∗), for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and candidate c1 is the unique winner
of this election. Thus, we arrive at the binary integer program (CE) of Figure
2 for Condorcet elections.
Constraint (10) defines the objective function as the maximum number of
voters allowed to take part in voting. Constraints (11) ensure that for all i ∈
{2, . . . ,m} the number of voters who gives a vote to candidate c1 over candidate
ci is strictly greater than the number of those who prefers ci over c1. Indeed,
the form of (11) is equivalent to the form
n∑
j=1
Aijxj >
n∑
j=1
(1−Aij)xj ,
which is based on the idea that for each voter vj either c1 dominates ci and
Aij = 1, or c1 is dominated by ci, and therefore Aij = 0 and the coefficient
(1−Aij) is 1. In fact, this set of constraints makes c1 a unique winner. Finally,
(12) states that variables x1, . . . , xn are binary.
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For the program (CE) the necessary condition of the existence of a feasible
solution requires that for each candidate ci, i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, there exists at least
one voter vj , j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, who prefers c1 over ci. A feasible solution always
exists when the sufficient condition holds, thus, when there exists at least one
voter who gives a top preference to candidate c1 over any other candidates.
4.3 Plurality Election Model
As the third problem, we consider the constructive control by deleting candi-
dates for a given plurality election (C, V, (>v)v∈V ). Here, we assume the elec-
tion’s preference profile (>v)v ∈V to be specified by a list of n binary matrices
A1, . . . , An ∈ {0, 1}m×m such that for all i, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n} it
holds
A
j
ik = 1 ⇐⇒ ci >vj ck.
Note, that each Aj is nothing else than the binary matrix representation of the
linear strict order >vj . Hence, in the case of the example from Section 4.2 we
get the following binary matrices A1, A2, A3 ∈ {0, 1}4×4:
A1 =


0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0

 A2 =


0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0

 A3 =


0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0


Since we seek for a maximum subset C∗ of the set C of candidates such
that c1 wins the plurality election (C
∗, V, (>∗v)v∈V ), where (>
∗
v)v∈V denotes
the restriction of the preference profile (>v)v ∈V to the set C
∗, we represent the
solution by a binary decision vector x ∈ {0, 1}m such that xi = 1 iff candidate ci
is admitted to take part in the election, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Furthermore, we
introduce a set of auxiliary binary variables zji , where z
j
i = 1 holds iff candidate
ci is of the highest preference for voter vj among the set of candidates chosen
by the vector x, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. In such a way, the
solution of the problem can be derived by the binary integer program (PE) of
Figure 3.
Here, (13) defines the objective function as the maximum number of candi-
dates admitted to take part in the election. Constraints (14) imply that for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n} voter vj may give the highest preference to
candidate ci over all other candidates selected by the vector x only if there exists
no candidate ck, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, that is preferred by vj over ci. In its turn, (15)
imposes that when candidate ci is allowed to the contest, either ci must be of
the highest preference for the voter vj , or a candidate ck preferred over ci must
exist. Each of constraints (16) enforces that candidate ci cannot be of the high-
est preference for any voter if he is not permitted to participate in the election,
for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. Thus, the constraint requires for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} and
j ∈ {1, . . . , n} that zji = 0 if candidate ci has been deleted from the election.
The next constraints (17) ensure that candidate c1 is the candidate with the
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max
m∑
i=1
xi (13)
s.t.
m∑
k=1
A
j
kixk +mz
j
i ≤ m i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, j ∈ {1, . . . n} (14)
m∑
k=1
A
j
kixk + z
j
i − xi ≥ 0 i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, j ∈ {1, . . . n} (15)
n∑
j=1
z
j
i ≤ nxi i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} (16)
n∑
j=1
z
j
1 −
n∑
j=1
z
j
i ≥ 1 i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} (17)
xi ∈ {0, 1} i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (18)
z
j
i ∈ {0, 1} i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} (19)
Figure 3: Binary Integer Program for Plurality Elections (Deleting Candidates)
highest number of voters having c1 as top priority, and therefore is strictly pre-
ferred over other candidates. Implicitly, this set of constraints requires x1 = 1
and hence candidate c1 has to be selected in any feasible solution. Finally, (18)
and (19) state that variables x1, . . . , xm and z
1
1 , . . . , z
n
m are binary.
There always exists a feasible solution for the program (PE), which is guar-
anteed by possible deleting of all candidates but candidate c1 as the worst case.
4.4 Maximin Election Model
The fourth problem we consider is the constructive control by deleting voters in
elections with the maximin voting rule. We assume that the preference profile
(>v)v∈V is given by a list of n binary matrices A
1, . . . , An ∈ {0, 1}m×m such
that
A
j
ik = 1 ⇐⇒ ci >vj ck,
for all i, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We use a binary decision vector x ∈
{0, 1}n to represent the solution, where xj = 1 iff voter vj has a permission to
vote, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus, the advantage of candidate ci over candidate
ck can be computed as
advmaximin (ci, ck) =
n∑
j=1
A
j
ikxj ,
for all i, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Now, let candidate c1 be the winner of the maximin
election and let the positive integer variable b define the minimum advantage
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max
n∑
j=1
xj (20)
s.t.
n∑
j=1
A
j
ikxj − n (1− zik) ≤ b− 1 i ∈ {2, . . .m}, k ∈ {1, . . .m}, i 6= k
(21)
m∑
k=1, k 6=i
zik ≥ 1 i ∈ {2, . . .m}
(22)
b ≤
n∑
j=1
A
j
1kxj k ∈ {2, . . . ,m}
(23)
xj ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
(24)
zik ∈ {0, 1} i ∈ {2, . . .m}, k ∈ {1, . . .m}, i 6= k
(25)
b ∈ N>0 (26)
Figure 4: Integer Program for Maximin Elections (Deleting Voters)
of c1 over any other candidate. Subsequently, let for all i, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} with
i 6= 1 and i 6= k the auxiliary binary variable zik = 1 denote a situation when
advmaximin (ci, ck) < b.
Then, the solution of the posed problem can be derived by the integer program
(MME) of Figure 4.
Here, (20) defines the objective function as the maximum number of voters
allowed to take part in voting. Next, the set of constraints (21) strictly bound
the advantage values of any candidate but c1 by b. Its combination with con-
straints (22) forces at least the minimal advantage value of each candidate ci to
be bounded by b, for all i ∈ {2, . . .m}. In its turn, constraints (23) bound, and
therefore define b as the minimal advantage of c1. Finally, (24) and (25) state
that variables x1, . . . , xn and z21, . . . , zmm are binary, while (26) states that b is
a positive integer.
There always exists a feasible solution for the program (MME) if candidate
c1 is a winner concerning at least one of the voters. In fact, if there is voter vj ,
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, whose top preference is c1, then deleting of all other voters in
the worst case makes c1 the winner of the maximin-based rule election.
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4.5 Bucklin Election Model
The last two constructive control problems address elections with the (sim-
plified) Bucklin voting rule, which is resistant to the constructive control by
deleting voters as well as by deleting candidates.
We start first with the variant of the problem which stipulates deleting
voters. Doing so, we assume now that the preference profile (>v)v∈V is de-
scribed by a list of n binary matrices A1, . . . , An ∈ {0, 1}m×m such that for all
i, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n} it holds
A
j
ik = 1 ⇐⇒
{
k ∈ {m′, . . . ,m} and voter vj ranks the
candidate ci as m
′-th in his preference list.
In other words, candidate ci may obtain at least m
′ as the personal score from
voter vj . In such a way, ci gets 1 for each entry in the row i of binary matrix
Aj when it is the most preferred by vj over other candidates.
In case of the example from Section 4.2 we get the following binary matrices
A1, . . . , A3 ∈ {0, 1}4×4:
A1 =


1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1

 A2 =


1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1

 A3 =


0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1


Subsequently, to represent the problem’s solution we employ a binary de-
cision vector x ∈ {0, 1}n, where xj = 1 iff voter vj participates in voting.
Therefore,
∑n
j=1 A
j
ikxj determines the number of voters ready to give the score
k to candidate ci. Let, for all i, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the auxiliary binary variable
zik = 1 describe the situation when strictly more than a half of the voters
allowed to vote agree to give the score of k, i.e., rank ci among the top k candi-
dates. Then, the solution of the problem can be obtained by the binary integer
program (BEV) of Figure 5.
Constraint (27) defines the objective function as the maximum number of
voters allowed to take part in voting. Constraints (28) imply that each candidate
ci may earn the score k iff it obtains votes of strictly more than a half of the
participating voters, for all i, k ∈ {1, . . .m}. Specifically, the form of (28) is the
reduction of the form
1
2
+
1
2
n∑
j=1
xj −
n∑
j=1
A
j
ikxj + nzik ≤ n,
where the first constant ensures the strictness concerning the half of the total
number of votes given to ci, the second term defines the half of all the available
votes, the third term calculates the number of participating voters ready to give
the score k to ci, and finally the combination of the fourth term and the constant
in the right hand side introduces trigger variable zik to handle the corresponding
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max
n∑
j=1
xj (27)
s.t.
n∑
j=1
(
1
2
−Ajik
)
xj + nzik ≤ n−
1
2
i, k ∈ {1, . . .m} (28)
n∑
j=1
(
1
2
−Ajik
)
xj + nzik ≥ 0 i ∈ {2, . . .m}, k ∈ {1, . . .m} (29)
m∑
l=1
lz1l + (n− k) zik ≤ n− 1 i ∈ {2, . . .m}, k ∈ {1, . . .m} (30)
m∑
l=1
z1l ≥ 1 (31)
xj ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ {1, . . . , n} (32)
zik ∈ {0, 1} i ∈ {1, . . .m}, k ∈ {1, . . .m} (33)
Figure 5: Binary Integer Program for Bucklin Elections (Deleting Voters)
situation. Next, for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} and k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, constraints (29) force
indicator variable zik be equal to 1 every time when ci earns votes of more than
a half of the participating voters. The form of (29) is in fact equivalent to the
inequality
1
2
n∑
j=1
xj −
n∑
j=1
A
j
ikxj + nzik ≥ 0.
When each of the variables zik reveals that the given threshold is reached, then
(30) requires the minimal score obtained by the first candidate c1 be strictly
less than the scores obtained by any other candidates. Indeed, the form of
constraints (30) results from the form
m∑
l=1
lz1l + 1 ≤ kzik + n (1− zik) , (34)
where the left hand side defines the minimal score obtained by c1 and ensures
the strictness of the inequality of the voting rule, while the right hand side
defines the score obtained by ci and bounds the former. Note that constraints
(29) are imposed for all the candidates but the first one. Therefore, variable
z1k may not take the value of 1 for multiple scores k, k = 1 . . .m, while variable
zik for i = 2 . . .m must do this according to (29). This makes only one of
the variables z1l equal to 1 in the sum in the left hand side part of (34). It
is exactly the case corresponding to one of the possible scores l (at least the
smallest one), since the left hand side part is bounded by the right hand side
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part, while constraint (31) asks at least one variable z1k related to c1 be set to
1. In fact, (31) guarantees that at least the indicator pointing to the least score
obtained by c1 will trigger. Finally, (32) and (33) state that variables x1, . . . , xn
and z11, . . . , zmm are binary.
Similarly to the program (CE), the same necessary condition on the existence
of a feasible solution must hold for the program (BEV). It requires the existence
of at least one voter who prefers c1 over ci, for each i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. If this
condition fails, then no subset of voters can be deleted in order to guarantee
c1’s win. As the sufficient condition for the feasible solution, it is required
that at least one voter exists, who gives a top preference to c1 over any other
candidates.
Herein, we deal with the second variant of the control problem, where a
subset of candidates may be deleted from the Bucklin election. Compared with
the first case we change the input. Now, we suppose that the preference profile
(>v)v∈V is modeled as in the cases of plurality voting and maximin voting, that
is, by a list of n binary matrices A1, . . . , An ∈ {0, 1}m×m such that
A
j
ik = 1 ⇐⇒ ci >vj ck,
for all i, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. A binary decision vector x ∈ {0, 1}m
is used for the solution description, where xi = 1 iff candidate ci is admitted to
take part in the election, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
We construct the model in such a way that for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and j ∈
{1, . . . , n} candidate ci may obtain at least m
′ as a personal score from voter
vj when exactly m
′ − 1 candidates have higher ranks in vj ’s preference list. To
reveal this fact, we use a set of auxiliary binary variables yjil, where j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and i, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, such that yjil = 1 when candidate ci can get the score of
value l from voter vj , i.e., when the number of available candidates preferred
by vj over ci is strictly less than l. Subsequently, we determine the number of
voters ready to give the score l to candidate ci as
∑n
j=1 y
j
il. Let the further
auxiliary binary variables zil = 1 for all i, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} denote the situation
when strictly more than half of the voters rank candidate ci among the top most
l candidates. Then, the solution of the posed problem can be computed via the
binary integer program (BEC) of Figure 6.
Here (35) defines the objective function as the maximum number of candi-
dates admitted to take part in the election. Each of constraints (36) permits
the candidate ci to get a personal score of value l iff the number candidates
preferred by the voter vj over ci is strictly less than l. The form of (36) is the
outcome of
m∑
k=1
A
j
kixk + y
j
il −m
(
1− yjil
)
≤ l,
where the first term defines for voter vj the number of candidates which dom-
inate ci, while the remaining part introduces the trigger variable y
j
il. Each of
constraints (37) implies that candidate ci gets the personal score l from voter vj
when ranked among the top most l candidates and it participates in the election.
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max
m∑
i=1
xi (35)
s.t.
m∑
k=1
A
j
kixk + (m+ 1) y
j
il ≤ m+ l j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (36)
m∑
k=1
A
j
kixk +my
j
il −mxi ≥ l −m j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (37)
n∑
j=1
m∑
l=1
y
j
il − nmxi ≤ 0 i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} (38)
nzil −
n∑
j=1
y
j
il ≤
n− 1
2
i, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (39)
n∑
j=1
y
j
il − nzil ≤
n
2
i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (40)
m∑
q=1
qz1q + (n− l) zil ≤ n− 1 i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (41)
m∑
q=1
z1q ≥ 1 (42)
xi ∈ {0, 1} i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (43)
y
j
il ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (44)
zil ∈ {0, 1} i, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (45)
Figure 6: Binary Integer Program for Bucklin Elections (Deleting Candidates)
Indeed, the form of (37) is equivalent to
m∑
k=1
A
j
kixk +my
j
il +m (1− xi) ≥ l.
Subsequently, for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} constraints (38) restrict each candidate
ci to get any personal scores when it is not allowed in the election. For all
i, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} the set of constraints (39) allows candidate ci to earn the score
l iff it obtains strictly more than a half of all votes. In fact, the form of (39)
results from
1
2
+
n
2
−
n∑
j=1
y
j
il + nzil ≤ n,
where the first constant ensures the strictness concerning the half of the total
number of votes given to ci, the second term defines the half of all votes, the
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third term calculates the number of voters ready to give the score l to ci, and
finally the combination of the fourth term and the right hand side constant
introduces the trigger variable zil to handle the corresponding situation. In
its turn, constraints (40) force each indicator zil to be equal to 1 every time
when ci earns votes of more than a half of voters, for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} and
all l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. When zil reveals that the given threshold is reached, (41)
requires the minimal score obtained by the first candidate c1 to be strictly less
than the scores obtained by any other candidates. The form of (41) is equivalent
to
m∑
q=1
qz1q + 1 ≤ lzil + n (1− zil) , (46)
where the left hand side defines the minimal score obtained by c1 and ensures
the strictness of the inequality of the voting rule, while the right hand side
defines the score obtained by candidate ci and bounds the former. Note that
constraints (40) are imposed for all the candidates except c1. Therefore, variable
z1l may not take the value of 1 for multiple scores l in (40), l = 1 . . .m, while
variable zil for i = 2 . . .m must do this. Along with constraint (42), this forces
only one of the variables z1q be equal to 1 in the sum in the left hand side part of
(46). It is the case corresponding to one of the possible scores q for c1 (at least
the smallest one) as the left hand side part is bounded by the right hand side
part. Constraint (42) implies that c1 must get at least one of the scores, thus
at least one variable z1q must be set to 1. In fact, it guarantees that at least
the indicator pointing to the least score obtained by c1 will trigger. Finally,
the sets of constraints (43), (44) and (45) declare x1, . . . , xm, y
1
11, . . . , y
n
mm and
z11, . . . , zmm as binary.
There always exists a feasible solution for the (BEC) program which is guar-
anteed by deleting all possible candidates but c1.
4.6 Transition from Constructive Control to Destructive
Control
At the beginning of Section 4 we have promised to sketch how our models pro-
posed for problems of constructive control can be adopted for ones of destructive
control. Here, we explain the possible transition by the example of range vot-
ing. Recall the decisive constraints (8) of the program (RE). If we combine
these constraints into the single formula

 n∑
j=1
A1jxj −
n∑
j=1
A2jxj ≥ 1

 ∧ . . . ∧

 n∑
j=1
A1jxj −
n∑
j=1
Amjxj ≥ 1

 , (47)
then the binary decision vector x ∈ {0, 1}n of the program (RE) represents a
subset V ∗ of the set of voters V such that candidate c1 wins the range election
(C, V ∗, (sv)v∈V ∗) iff (47) holds. As a consequence, c1 is not the winner of
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(C, V ∗, (sv)v∈V ∗) iff the negation of (47) holds, or, equivalently, iff
 n∑
j=1
A1jxj −
n∑
j=1
A2jxj ≤ 0

 ∨ . . . ∨

 n∑
j=1
A1jxj −
n∑
j=1
Amjxj ≤ 0

 (48)
is true. Such constraints with disjunctions are frequently called k-fold alterna-
tive constraints, where k defines the least number of constraints of the set which
must be satisfied. In fact, mathematical programs with alternative constraints
are no longer linear. But there is a standard technique to transform alternative
constraints into a set of equivalent linear constraints; for details, see Chapter 9
of [Bradley et al., 1977]. In our case it uses k = 1 and replaces (48) by
n∑
j=1
A1jxj −
n∑
j=1
Aijxj ≤M (1− yi) i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} (49)
m∑
i=2
yi ≥ 1 (50)
yi ∈ {0, 1} i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} (51)
where each of auxiliary binary variables y2, . . . , ym reflects the satisfaction of
the corresponding inequality of (48), and M is a large constant. In fact,
yi = 1 when candidate c1 obtains less or equal number of scores than can-
didate ci. The constant M ensures that for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} the formula∑n
j=1 A1jxj −
∑n
j=1 Aijxj ≤ M (1− yi) holds if y = 1. Here M is set as
M = n · maxi∈{1,...,m},j∈{1,...,n}Aij . The constraint (50) implies that at least
one inequality of (48) holds, and therefore there exists at least one candidate
with scores equal or greater than candidate c1’s. In such a way, to obtain the
model for the destructive control problem one needs to replace constraints (8)
of the (RE) model by (49) and (50), and add those of (51).
To adopt other proposed models in order to tackle the destructive control
problems, it is necessary to substitute constraints responsible for the winner’s
determination with corresponding k-fold constraints.
5 Computational Investigation
In this section, the performance of the integer programs proposed in Section 4
is evaluated in terms of their solution quality and the needed computation time.
We have implemented the program code in the programming language JAVA us-
ing the Cplex 12.6 library with default settings such as 1e-6 for the feasibility
and optimality tolerances and 1e-5 for the integrality tolerance. The experi-
ments have been carried out on a desktop PC with an Intel Core i7 processor
with 2.0 GHz and 8 Gb RAM.
In the following, the efficiency of the proposed integer programming election
models is evaluated via PrefLib, assembled by ([Mattei and Walsh, 2013]). Pre-
fLib is a centralized repository of real world preference data. Currently this li-
brary holds over 3000 datasets in an easily available and computer readable form.
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The data comes from various sources and locations. They are based on real
elections (e.g., from Aspern, Berkley, Dublin, Glasgow, and trade unions in the
European Union), real competitions (like the women’s 1998 skating world cham-
pionships and cross country skiing from the 2006-2009 world championships),
comparison of websearches (across Bing, Google, Yahoo and Ask), reviews of
hotels and etc. Despite the voters of each instance of the library are grouped
according to the equality of their preference lists, in our experiments we treat
them independently assigning each one a separate decision variable. Further-
more, we select the first candidate of the list of candidates provided by each
instance as the target winner c1.
5.1 Range Voting
To evaluate our range election model, we adopt the instances of the “Tied
Order - Complete List” benchmark suite of PrefLib ([Mattei and Walsh, 2013]).
Within this suite both the relation of equivalence and the strict order relation
between the candidates may exist for each of the voters. For every instance of
the suite we construct the election as Borda-like election1, i.e., by assigning the
score of value m−1 to the most preferred candidates of a voter, m−2 to ones at
the second place, and so on, while the least score of 0 is given to the candidate
at the last place m in a linearly ordered preference list (without ties) only.
The up-to-date version of the benchmark suite consists of 331 instances. The
largest instance in terms of the number of voters contains 299 664 voters and 5
candidates, while the largest instance in terms of the number of candidates has
2 819 of them and 4 voters. Exactly 293 of the 331 instances have been solved
either to optimality or to optimality respecting the optimality tolerance. For
each of the other 38 instances the infeasibility of the solution concerning the
first candidate as a winner has been detected. The specific reasons that result
in infeasibility are discussed in Section 4.1. The computation time per instance
is at most 3.5 seconds, while the median over all instances is 0.016 seconds only.
In fact, all the range election instances from the presented benchmark suite can
be easily solved. The total computation time over the whole suite is 25 seconds.
5.2 Preference-based Voting
To test the other proposed integer programming election models of Section 4 we
employ the instances of the “Strict Orders - Complete List” benchmark suite
of PrefLib ([Mattei and Walsh, 2013]). Within this suite only a strict order
relation between each pair of candidates is given for every voter such that the
candidates are linearly ordered by each single voter. The suite contains 627
instances in total. The largest instance in terms of the number of voters has
14 081 of them and 3 candidates, while the largest instance in terms of the
number of candidates has 242 of them and 5 voters. Table 1 contains the
information concerning the computation times required by the Cplex solver to
1Note, that the elections are not Borda elections since the instances allow ties.
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Table 1: Running times used by Condorcet, plurality, maximin and Bucklin
election models
m 1-9 10-99 100-199 ≥ 200
n 4-14081 4-5000 4-5 4-242
n′ 21 4 4 5
c 523 77 21 6
CE
min 0 0 0 0
median 0.015 0 0 0.015
average 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.015
max 0.078 0.047 0.016 0.032
PE
min 0 0.015 0.250 1.092
median 0.016 0.063 0.374 1.396
average 0.111 4.310 0.368 1.547
max 7.441 324.919 0.530 2.152
MME
min 0 0 0.109 2.246
median 0.016 0.031 0.203 16.622
average 0.027 0.058 0.299 15.452
max 0.218 1.061 2.013 27.518
BEV
min 0 0 0.905 11.762
median 0.031 0.125 1.763 48.298
average 0.042 0.431 3.810 50.807
max 0.281 4.680 17.800 93.054
BEC
min 0 0.047 91.604 6950.672
median 0.032 2.450 238.494 12410.285
average 2.297 86.243 282.090 14527.973
max 469.891 5135.537 978.516 30466.901
find the optimal solutions for the instances of the Condorcet, plurality, maximin
and Bucklin election models. The whole set of test instances is partitioned into
four classes according to the number m of candidates. Thus, the first class
contains instances whose number of candidates m falls into the range from 1
to 9, while the second, third and fourth classes have the number of candidates
in the ranges 10-99, 100-199, and greater than 200, respectively. The classes
correspond to the last four columns of the table one-to-one. The first four rows
of the table report the number of candidates m, the number of voters n, the
median n′ of the number of voters, and the number of instances c in each of
the classes, respectively. Therefore, most of the instances are rather small in
terms of the number of candidates. Specifically, 523 of them are contained in
the first class. The remaining rows are grouped and present the minimum,
median, average and maximum computation time over each of the classes for
every election model we have presented.
For the Condorcet election model of Section 4.2, exactly 605 out of 627
instances have been solved to optimality. For the remaining 22 instances infea-
sibility respecting the target win of the first candidate has been shown. It takes
significantly less than a second to solve any of the instances, while the whole
suite has been computed in 5.5 seconds.
For the plurality election model of Section 4.3, optimal solutions have been
found for all instances of the suite. Here 613 instances, thus almost all of the
627 instances, require less than a second to be solved. However, one instance
occurred that needs significantly more computation time comparing to the oth-
ers. It has the largest mn product, i.e., the value that strongly correlates with
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the number of constraints used by the model. Specifically, its mn product is
50 000 and it takes 324 seconds to find the optimal solution. The whole suite
can be evaluated in 407 seconds.
For the maximin election model of Section 4.4, exactly 605 out of 627 in-
stances have been solved to optimality, where 619 instances require less than a
second of computation time. For the unsolved 22 instances infeasibility respect-
ing the win of the first candidate has been proved. The maximum computation
time over all instances results in 28 seconds. In fact, only the instances of the
last class corresponding to the largest m incur considerable computation time.
The whole suite has been evaluated in 117 seconds.
For the Bucklin election model with deleting voters of Section 4.5, again for
605 out of 627 instances optimal solutions have been obtained. Exactly 593
instances are computed rather fast; each within one second. Only the last two
classes of instances with a larger value of m are time-consuming. The whole
suite for this model is solved in 430 sec.
The Bucklin election model with deleting candidates of Section 4.5 has shown
to be considerably harder to solve. Despite of the fact that 433 of the 627
instances have been solved within a second, there are hard instances with a
maximum computation time of around 8.5 hours. Specifically, all the instances
with a number of candidates greater than 100 are rather time-consuming. Even
the instances with a small number of candidates but large number of voters
require considerably more time than those of other election models. This is
mainly because of the increased number of auxiliary variables and constraints
used for the problem representation. For all instances the optimal solutions
have been found in a total computation time of approximately 28 hours.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced various voting systems and types of control of elections and
shown how hard control problems can be modeled as integer programs. Using
the solver Cplex and test suites from PrefLib we have demonstrated that the
approach allows to treat also larger instances successfully. Our experiments
show that a proven hardness result of a control type is not a secure protection
for the fraudulent falsification of outcomes of elections using this type.
As a future work, we are interested in extensions of our approach to other
kinds of voting systems and other kinds of illegal influences. Examples for the
first are fallback voting and SP-AV, examples for the latter are partition of
the voters and bribery. In respect thereof, of great value it may be to investi-
gate related computing methods like SAT-solving, constraint programming, and
functional-logic programming.
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